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Introduction 
One of the most significant characteristics of the peace process in 
Northern Ireland has been the profound importance attached by a range of 
academic, political and non-governmental actors to the concept of human 
rights. Human rights have, as one scholar puts it, ‘moved from the margins 
to the mainstream’ (Harvey 2001, 342) of political life in Northern Ireland 
and in so doing have become a dominant characteristic of contemporary 
political discourse there (Mageean and O'Brien 1999; Kavanagh 2004). 
The pervasiveness of human rights discourse in both the practical 
circumstances of the body politic in Northern Ireland and in theoretical 
reflections about the nature of the conflict there is in many ways a 
reflection of the fact that we live in what one scholar has called the ‘age of 
rights’ (Bobbio 1996). Despite profound philosophical disagreement about 
what rights are (Griffin 2008), over the past 60 years human rights have 
established themselves, as one scholar puts it, as the ‘coin of the normative 
realm, the lingua franca of moral and political claim making’ (Ingram 
2008, 41). Political culture in Northern Ireland has not been immune from 
‘rights talk’ (Glendon 1991). Indeed, in many ways, the legacy of ethnic 
conflict, territorial division and political disagreement there has proved 
fertile ground for the emergence of a strong, hegemonic and powerful 
rights discourse. In Northern Ireland the new rights culture has found 
strong support within three key sections of society: first, within scholarly 
circles—particularly among a particular group of Northern Ireland-based 
legal academics who argue that the post-conflict circumstances of 
Northern Ireland and the constitutional, legal and political change that has 
occurred there are more appropriately explained, analysed and reflected 
upon using analytical frameworks offered by transitional justice discourse 
(Bell 2003; Campbell et al. 2003; Bell et al. 2004; Campbell and Ni 
Aolain 2005; McEvoy 2007); second, by Irish nationalist and Irish 
republican political parties in Northern Ireland (SDLP and Sinn Fein) 
which have a long tradition of expressing political preferences and 
positions during the conflict in Northern Ireland using the language of 
human rights; and third, by human rights activists in non-governmental 
organisations such as the Committee on the Administration of Justice 
(CAJ) who have long argued for a ‘rights-based’ solution to the seemingly 
intractable problem of the conflict in Northern Ireland (Mageean and 
O'Brien 1999). 
However, in Northern Ireland support for this new narrative of human 
rights has not been universal. Influential strands of unionist opinion, more 
so than other elite political actors in Northern Ireland, have expressed 
scepticism about many of the institutional developments in human rights 
protection that have occurred as a result of the Belfast Agreement, have 
been suspicious of the political claims that human rights discourse has 
made in Northern Ireland since 1998 and are anxious about the attempt to 
create a new orthodoxy in the body politic of Northern Ireland which 
places human rights at the apex and pinnacle of political discourse. The 
anxiety felt by unionism is neatly encapsulated in this statement from a 
unionist Member of the Northern Ireland Assembly, who in a contribution 
to a debate in the Assembly about a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland 
argued that: 
Unionists, however, became detached—or more accurately, dislodged 
from the rights process. That was understandable in Northern Ireland ... It 
was sickening for many Unionists to hear the clamour for rights coming 
most loudly and frequently from those who denied basic rights to people 
in our country. It was nauseating to hear how barristers or solicitors who 
defended terrorists or suspected terrorists were referred to as human rights 
lawyers. That caused great unease in our community (DUP MLA, Simon 
Hamilton, 27 October 2007).1 
The purpose of this article is to explore how unionist political 
representatives increasingly relied on a ‘court sceptic’ narrative to 
articulate a case against the proposals from the Northern Ireland Bill of 
Rights Forum (NIBoRF) (2008) and the Northern Ireland Human Rights 
Commission (NIHRC) (2001, 2004 and 2008). The fundamental point 
made by elite-level political actors from the unionist community is that the 
Bill of Rights proposals would emasculate the legislature and result in the 
transfer of power over social policy matters from the legislature to the 
judiciary. This ‘court sceptic’ concern is reflective of a narrative found in 
other parts of the common law world in countries with similar legal, 
political and constitutional traditions to the UK about the constitutional 
protection of human rights. In those countries such as Canada, Australia 
and New Zealand, vigorous debate has taken place about the utility of 
constitutionally entrenched rights. Central to this ‘court sceptic’ (Hiebert 
2006) narrative is this claim—why when certain individual needs, interests 
and desires have been identified as a right should that right then be 
constitutionalised in the form of a Bill of Rights and the power to resolve, 
adjudicate and apply what is meant by a certain right be handed to the 
judiciary? The suggestion of this article is that the ‘court sceptic’ narrative 
is a useful analytical lens through which to explore post-Good Friday 
Agreement (GFA) unionist discourses about human rights and will help 
scholars of the conflict in Northern Ireland arrive at a deeper 
understanding of this particular aspect of post-conflict politics there. In the 
period after the Belfast Agreement scholarly literature on unionism and 
the Belfast Agreement tended to focus on intra- and inter-unionist 
divisions on the agreement (Evans and Tonge 2001; Kaufman and 
Patterson 2007), explanations and analyses on why unionism decided to 
reach agreement in 1998 (Farrington 2006a and 2006b), deconstructions of 
‘new’ unionist ideology (Patterson 2004), cleavages in unionist identity 
(Ganiel 2006; Southern 2007a) and unionist alienation (Southern 2007b) 
rather than on exploring unionist discourses about human rights. In many 
ways Christopher Farrington's (2006a and 2006b) work on unionism and 
the Northern Ireland peace process, some of which has featured in this 
journal, offers a useful framework for understanding unionist responses to 
the peace process but it fails to engage sufficiently with unionist responses 
to a Bill of Rights. Therefore, this article hopes to fill a gap in the 
literature on this particular aspect of post Agreement unionist politics. For 
the empirical aspect of this article which explores how unionist responses 
to the Bill of Rights debate relied on ‘court sceptic’ arguments, a range of 
sources have been examined and analysed. First, the article examined the 
five debates that took place in the Northern Ireland Assembly on a Bill of 
Rights from 2001 to 2010. Second, it has examined the responses of the 
unionist parties to the various public consultation exercises organised on a 
Bill of Rights by the NIHRC and by the government from 2001 to 2010. 
The article is divided into three sections. It will begin by considering the 
more abstract discussion about what is meant by the term ‘court sceptic’ 
before, second, moving on to provide an overview of how rights discourse 
has moved from the margins to the mainstream of the body politic in 
Northern Ireland. Third, it will go on to examine the evidence supporting 
the argument that unionist responses to the Northern Ireland Bill of Rights 
debate increasingly relied on ‘court sceptic’ arguments before discussing 
the significance of this. 
The ‘Court Sceptic’ Concern 
The term ‘court sceptic’ first appeared in the literature in an article written 
by the Canadian political scientist, Janet Hiebert (2006) in the Modern 
Law Review. The phrase was used by the author as a way of summarising 
sceptical concerns about Bills of Rights and the practice of entrenching 
individual rights within a constitutional charter subject to strong judicial 
review that had arisen within a significant body of literature (Griffith 
1979; Waldron, 1993, 1998 and 1999; Allan 1996, 2002 and 2008; 
Tomkins 2005; Bellamy 2007). Hiebert defines a court sceptic as someone 
who accepts ‘the legitimacy of individual rights but doubt[s] the prudence 
of giving courts final responsibility for interpreting and resolving political 
disagreements involving rights, for a range of reasons such as democratic 
concerns or institutional competence’ (Hiebert 2006, 10). In other words 
these scholars are ‘troubled by the implications for liberal democratic 
communities of structuring and evaluating political debates through a 
judicially interpreted bill of rights’ (Hiebert 2006, 24). Hiebert 
distinguishes the sceptical positions in the academic literature between 
those who are ‘rights sceptics’ and those who are ‘court sceptics’. As 
Hiebert argues, 
Rights sceptics criticise the ways in which a bill of rights influences 
notions of citizenship and political community ... Court Sceptics argue that 
a bill of rights will distort debates about contested issues ... the very notion 
that judicial interpretation replaces debate contradicts the democratic 
imperative of on-going deliberations about the role of the state, the nature 
of problems that affect a polity and the propriety of specific social policies 
(Hiebert 2006, 10). 
The idea and scholarly expression of ‘court sceptic’ arguments against a 
constitutionally entrenched Bill of Rights has been heavily associated with 
the distinguished legal philosopher Jeremy Waldron who, according to one 
colleague who would share his scholarly analysis of Bills of Rights, ‘is 
without doubt, the leading Bills of Rights critic writing today’ (Allan, 
2008, 161). Within the literature it is possible to discern three central 
elements to the ‘court sceptic’ narrative. First, to paraphrase Waldron, 
‘there are many of us and we disagree about rights’. In other words the 
court sceptic concern questions the desirability of taking an individual 
human, moral or legal right and translating it into a constitutionally 
entrenched right given the profound disagreement that exists at a 
philosophical level about what precisely is meant by a human right, what 
needs, interests or entitlements constitute human rights and about what the 
foundations of human rights are. As Waldron argues, 
It is puzzling ... that some philosophers and jurists treat rights as though 
they were somehow beyond disagreement, as though they could be dealt 
with on a different plane in law—on the solemn plane of constitutional 
principle far from the hurly burly of legislatures and political controversy 
and disreputable procedures like voting (Waldron 1999, 12). 
Second, because of the considerable disagreement about the nature, scope 
and foundations of human rights, court sceptic discourses argue that the 
judiciary should not have the final say in the resolution of these 
arguments—that it is profoundly inappropriate to privilege judges over 
elected legislators under this process. Court sceptics question why the 
judiciary is better placed to resolve these disagreements. As J. A. G. 
Griffith argues, 
The trouble with the higher order law is that it must be given substance, be 
interpreted, and be applied. It claims superiority over democratically 
elected institutions; it prefers philosopher kings to human politicians; it 
puts faith in judges whom I would trust no more than I trust princes 
(Griffith 2000, 165). 
Put a different way, the issue can be conceived as one of ‘institutional 
morality’ (Phillipson 2007). In other words, where should the power and 
authority to resolve and adjudicate on disagreements about the nature of 
human rights lie: with the judiciary or the legislature? The third aspect of 
the ‘court sceptic’ narrative is that a constitutionally entrenched Bill of 
Rights enforced by the judiciary limits the right of citizens to participate in 
the ebb and flow of political life in the body politic. Participation, 
according to Waldron, is the ‘right of rights’ in any democratic polity, but 
when disagreements about matters of social policy are removed from the 
legislature and transferred to the judiciary under a Bill of Rights, resolving 
disagreements about the ‘circumstances of politics’ can no longer be the 
citizen's concern. As Waldron argues, 
Some of us think that people have a right to participate in the democratic 
governance of their community, and that this right is quite deeply 
connected to the values of autonomy and responsibility ... We think 
moreover that the right to democracy is a right to participate on equal 
terms in social decisions on issues of high principle and that it is not to be 
confined to interstitial matters of social and economic policy. I shall argue 
that our respect for such democratic rights is called seriously into question 
when proposals are made to shift decisions about the conception and 
revision of basic rights from the legislature to the courtroom (Waldron 
1993, 221). 
Entrenching a Bill of Rights within a nation's constitutional system would, 
in Griffith's words, mean that ‘political questions of much day to day 
significance would, even more than at present, be left to decision by the 
judiciary’ (Griffith 1979, 14). In other words these decisions would no 
longer be left to elected politicians to deliberate upon and where, through 
elections and other means, citizens can participate in the process, but 
would be left to an unelected judiciary to resolve. The potential for the 
increased politicisation of the legal process that may occur under a 
constitutionally entrenched Bill of Rights, particularly one that enshrines 
social and economic rights, is a theme taken up recently by the human 
rights academic Connor Gearty, who argues that: 
The least effective way of securing social rights is via an over-
concentration on the legal process, with the constitutionalisation of such 
rights being an especial disaster wherever it occurs. Such a move turns the 
whole subject over to its falsest of false friends, the lawyers, a community 
which (in this context and however generally well meaning) amount to 
little more than an array of pseudo-politicians on the look out for short 
cuts to difficult questions and for ways for plying their trade that are more 
agreeable to their ethical slaves (Gearty and Mantouvalou 2010, 1). 
Both Waldron and James Allan have argued that the idea of 
‘precommitment’ inherent within a set of constitutional rights, which 
‘presents constitutional constraints as a form of immunization against 
madness’ (Waldron 1999, 306), ultimately leads to citizens becoming 
further alienated and disenfranchised from the political process. Court 
sceptics would argue that the process of regular free and fair elections 
within a democracy permits some degree of democratic accountability and 
participation for the citizen, but precommitting a set of rights in a 
constitutional charter making it immune from change merely transfers 
power from a much larger elite with at least some degree of democratic 
control for the citizen to a much smaller elite with virtually no entry points 
for the citizen to express his or her say about their decisions. 
Those familiar with both normative and descriptive accounts of the UK's 
constitution and with recent debates about its future will recognise the 
‘court sceptic’ narrative as sharing many similarities with the discourse of 
the ‘political constitution’ (Griffith 1979; Tomkins 2003 and 2005; 
Bellamy 2007). Whereas once the British constitution was traditionally 
viewed as a political constitution with its defining characteristic contained 
in Griffith's dictum that ‘the constitution of the United Kingdom lives on 
changing from day to day for the constitution is no more and no less than 
what happens’ (Griffith 1979, 19), it is now caught up in a battle between 
competing conceptions of the UK constitution—the legal and the political 
constitution. In more recent times political theorists (Bellamy 2007) and 
public law scholars (Tomkins 2003 and 2005) have sought to build upon 
Griffith's original work and attempted to outline a more normatively 
grounded theoretical statement of what constitutes a discourse of political 
constitutionalism rather than the descriptive account that they argue 
Griffith provided. Adam Tomkins argues that orthodox understandings of 
the UK's ‘political constitution’ have, over the past 30 years, ‘come under 
increasing pressure from the rival theory of legal constitutionalism’ 
(Tomkins 2003, 21). Indeed, according to Tomkins the distinction between 
visions of the political constitution and the legal constitution is of more 
profound significance to understanding constitutionalism in the 21st 
century than the more familiar distinction often made in public law 
scholarship between written and unwritten; codified and uncodified 
constitutions. Richard Bellamy (2007) argues that political 
constitutionalism is ‘superior both normatively and empirically to the legal 
constitutional devices’ that are imposed as essential constraints upon 
democracy and majority rule. He argues that legal constitutionalism 
subverts ‘these democratic protections, creating sources of arbitrariness 
and dominance of their own in the process’ (Bellamy 2007, 2). At the 
heart of discourses of legal constitutionalism lies a commitment to the 
constitutional entrenchment of individual rights and, as Bellamy argues, 
‘nothing has been so influential in driving constitutionalism along the 
paths of legal rather than political thought than the emphasis on rights, 
their entrenchment in a constitutional document and their interpretation 
and elaboration by a supreme or constitutional court’ (Bellamy 2007, 15). 
Some commentators trace the emergence of this debate between the legal 
and political constitution in the UK to the passage of the Human Rights 
Act (HRA) in 1998. According to one scholar the HRA represents the 
‘cornerstone of the new British Constitution’ (Bogdanor 2009, 62). Until 
the HRA came into force in 2000, the UK was, in Colm O'Cinneide's 
words, a ‘partial exception’ to trends in other countries in Europe and in 
other countries such as New Zealand and Canada that have similar legal, 
constitutional and political traditions as the UK. Under the political 
constitution the protection of rights and the expansion of the realm of 
individual freedom was realised in the UK constitutional tradition through 
the legislature and not through the judiciary. As O'Cinneide points out, 
‘fundamental rights have historically been governed by political, not legal 
processes’ (O'Cinneide 2008, 159). The British experience of rights 
protection prior to the HRA was very much based on a Diceyean notion of 
negative liberty where citizens' fundamental rights and liberties were 
protected, defined and decided on through the legislative process, not by 
handing power over this area to the judiciary and unelected judges. This 
blurring of the political and legal is of paramount importance to political 
constitutionalists who warn that the problem with constitutionally 
entrenched charters of rights is that they facilitate the judicialisation of the 
body politic and the legalisation of political discourse. In other words, as 
Griffith (1979, 12) argued, ‘what are truly questions of politics and 
economics are presented as questions of law’. One scholar (Gardbaum 
2001 and 2010) argues that the UK example of the HRA 1998 and the 
New Zealand example of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act (NZBORA) 
1990 have both attempted to preserve parliamentary sovereignty by trying 
to strike the appropriate institutional balance between the legislature and 
the judiciary. Both Stephen Gardbaum (2001 and 2010) and Hiebert (2004 
and 2006) argue that the UK and New Zealand examples of rights 
protection represent a halfway house between an American model of 
rights protection, with strong judicial review over legislative actions, and 
the constitutionalism exemplified by the tradition of the Westminster 
Model where rights and liberties are guaranteed through a pragmatic 
compromise between the legislature and the courts. One of the main 
reasons why scholars view the UK model of rights protection as a 
‘halfway’ house is because of section 4 of the HRA which allows the 
judiciary to determine whether a provision of primary legislation is 
compatible with the rights enshrined in the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR). Where a conflict is deemed to arise, a judge is at 
liberty to issue a declaration of incompatibility that invites parliament to 
respond and have the final say on how to deal with the legislative 
provision in question. Gardbaum (2001) refers to this model as 
‘commonwealth constitutionalism’ and argues that this ‘third model of 
constitutionalism ... stands between the two polar models of constitutional 
and legislative supremacy’ (Gardbaum 2001, 876). Under this model, as 
Gardbaum argues, parliament, not the courts, has the final word. As 
Gardbaum observes, ‘most noticeably, while granting courts the power to 
protect rights, they decouple judicial review from judicial supremacy by 
empowering legislatures to have the final word’ (Gardbaum 2001, 709). 
Hiebert argues that the parliamentary rights model is fundamentally 
different from an American-style system of judicial review because of the 
‘political rights review’ and institutional dialogue it creates (Hiebert 2004, 
82). These questions will continue to dominate UK constitutional thinking 
in the future and will be a very real source of dialectical tension played out 
in the competing debates in theory and in practice between political and 
legal constitutionalists. Having sketched out briefly what is meant by the 
term ‘court sceptic’ and how it connects to contemporary debates in 
British constitutionalism, this article now turns to consider how human 
rights have moved from the margins to the mainstream of political life in 
Northern Ireland. 
From the Margins to the Mainstream 
The Belfast Agreement/Good Friday Agreement of 1998 marked a 
watershed for the emergence of human rights in Northern Ireland. Indeed, 
one of the distinctive features of the Belfast Agreement compared with 
previous attempts at finding a solution to the conflict in Northern Ireland 
lies in the fact that human rights were afforded such a central status in the 
final text of the Agreement. As the late Queen's University Belfast human 
rights academic Stephen Livingstone commented, 
while many have commented on the fact that, unlike the Sunningdale 
Agreement of 1973, the Belfast Agreement of 1998 included all the parties 
to the conflict and made more extensive provisions on North–South and 
East–West relationships, few have observed that it also contains a much 
more extensive set of provisions on rights (Livingstone 2001, 279). 
For Brendan O'Leary, the explicitly liberal consociationalist nature of the 
political settlement reached in the Belfast Agreement required a strong 
Bill of Rights to reinforce the consociational settlement: 
what system of human rights provision does this liberal consociation 
require? The answer most obviously, is: a Bill of Rights and a legal system 
that is consistent with it. That in turn implies that each of the four 
elements of the consociational system must be appropriately protected 
where necessary (O'Leary 2001, 354). 
The Belfast Agreement, given statutory form by the Northern Ireland Act 
1998, created an entirely new framework for human rights protection in 
Northern Ireland that included a new Human Rights Commission, an 
Equality Commission and, under the St Andrews Agreement of 2006, a 
Forum to consider a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland. However, it is the 
debate about the nature, scope and detail of any future Bill of Rights that 
has dominated post-Agreement human rights discourse in Northern Ireland 
following the recommendation contained in the Belfast Agreement for the 
newly constituted Human Rights Commission to: 
Consult and to advise on the scope for defining, in Westminster 
legislation, rights supplementary to those in the European Convention on 
Human Rights, to reflect the particular circumstances of Northern Ireland, 
drawing as appropriate on international instruments and experience. These 
additional rights to reflect the principles of mutual respect for the identity 
and ethos of both communities and parity of esteem, and—taken together 
with the ECHR—to constitute a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland 
(Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement 1998, s. 4). 
There has been a long history of debate and consideration of the issue in 
the context of Northern Ireland politics, which predates the Belfast 
Agreement (Harvey and Schwartz 2009). In the turbulent world of 
Northern Ireland politics in the 1960s the Liberal MP Sheelagh 
Murnaghan attempted to introduce a human rights bill four times in the 
Northern Ireland Parliament between 1964 and 19682 but on each occasion 
was frustrated by the Unionist government. The Ulster Unionist party in 
its 1973 election manifesto3 supported the introduction of a Northern 
Ireland Bill of Rights and in 1977 a report by the Standing Advisory 
Commission on Human Rights (SACHR) advised that human rights in 
Northern Ireland would be best protected through the incorporation of the 
ECHR ‘as the basis for any Bill of Rights whether for Northern Ireland or 
for the United Kingdom’.4 The NIHRC, under its first chair, Professor 
Brice Dickson, began the process of drafting a Bill of Rights for Northern 
Ireland in 2000 with the establishment of nine working groups to assist the 
Commission in its work of identifying which rights would be suggested 
for inclusion in any future bill. In September 2001, the Commission 
officially launched a public consultation document5 and in April 2004 
issued a further document for public consultation with the intention of 
consolidating the work that had been carried out to date. The lack of 
progress on a Bill of Rights was a constant source of frustration to the 
many human rights NGOs in Northern Ireland such as the CAJ and Irish 
nationalist and republican parties such as the SDLP and Sinn Fein. 
However, this must be viewed against the backdrop of the uncertain 
political context in which the NIHRC operated. Devolution in Northern 
Ireland was suspended in 2002 and was not restored until May 2007. That 
period was characterised by an intensive focus on political negotiations 
aimed at restoring the power-sharing executive and by intra-unionist and 
nationalist political wrangling. At times a Bill of Rights for Northern 
Ireland did not appear to be high on the political agenda of any political 
party. Furthermore, as the chief commissioner of the NIHRC during this 
period, Brice Dickson observed, the work of the NIHRC, particularly on a 
Bill of Rights and the question of increased powers for its work, was 
caught up in the zero-sum politics of the peace process and was being used 
as a bargaining chip by the two governments with Sinn Fein over the 
matter of IRA decommissioning and in securing further progress in the 
political process in Northern Ireland. As he put it in an interview in 
December 2004, 
They have allowed, it seems to us, the powers of the commission to be 
used as one of the bargaining chips in the talks between the political 
parties. I wouldn't be surprised if the two prime ministers don't make some 
reference to the powers of the Human Rights Commission which they see 
as something they can give to Sinn Fein in return for concessions from the 
republican movement. The reality is that human rights should be above 
politics, and the Human Rights Commission needs effective powers 
whatever the political environment in which it is working (Dickson 2004). 
As a result of the lack of progress on the issue, the St Andrews Agreement 
(2006) contained a commitment to establish a forum to consider a Bill of 
Rights for Northern Ireland consisting of representatives from political 
parties and civil society. The forum met for the first time in December 
2006 and in its final report of March 2008 made 41 substantive proposals 
and 216 secondary recommendations. On the basis of the forum's report 
and its own deliberations, the NIHRC, in fulfilling its statutory duty 
contained in section 69 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 to advise the 
secretary of state on a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights, issued its advice to 
the secretary of state for Northern Ireland on the nature, size and scope of 
a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights in December 2008. The NIHRC advice 
to the UK government proposed the inclusion of 27 substantive rights in a 
Northern Ireland Bill of Rights, and the incorporation of 12 (from this 
total of 27) substantive rights with 42 provisions that are supplementary to 
both the ECHR and the HRA. 
The main unionist parties in Northern Ireland, the Democratic Unionist 
party (DUP) and the Ulster Unionist party (UUP), withheld their support 
for both the NIHRC advice and the Bill of Rights Forum report while two 
NIHRC commissioners identified with the unionist tradition—Daphne 
Trimble (wife of former first minister and UUP leader David Trimble) and 
Jonathan Bell (DUP councillor, now a member of the Northern Ireland 
Assembly)—dissented from the NIHRC's advice. In November 2009, in a 
move that some unionist politicians claim vindicated their position on the 
NIHRC proposals for a Bill of Rights, the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) 
issued a formal response to the NIHRC's advice.6 To the consternation of a 
number of human rights organisations, the NIHRC and both the SDLP and 
Sinn Fein, the government explicitly recommended only two provisions 
proposed by the NIHRC advice for inclusion in a future Bill of Rights: the 
‘right to vote/be elected’ and the ‘right to identify oneself and be accepted 
as British or Irish or both’. In short, the government rejected over half the 
proposals contained in the advice received from the Human Rights 
Commission. In response to the public consultation on the NIO's position, 
a number of civil society organisations, nationalist political parties and the 
NIHRC have all heavily criticised the British government for issuing such 
a weak document (e.g. CAJ 2010; NIHRC 2010). Furthermore, supporters 
of an expansive Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland are now faced with the 
fact that the largest party in the UK's coalition government, the 
Conservative party, has already indicated, while in opposition, that it did 
not support the NIHRC's recommendations and would be dealing with 
Northern Ireland-specific issues as a subset of its proposal for a British 
Bill of Rights which David Cameron intended to enact to replace the 
HRA. As the then shadow secretary of state for justice, Dominic Grieve 
MP, argued in a speech in Belfast, 
The NIHRC report, as has been widely acknowledged, went a long way 
outside the remit that had been laid down for it. Although I recognise its 
good intent, it [the NIHRC] produced a blueprint for Northern Ireland 
which if implemented would represent a fundamental constitutional 
change (Grieve 2010). 
Having outlined the context, both empirically and theoretically, this article 
will now turn to explore how unionists came to rely increasingly on ‘court 
sceptic’ arguments as part of their narrative on a Bill of Rights. 
Unionists as ‘Court Sceptics’ 
It is important to understand that at the very beginning of the NIHRC 
consultation process on a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland, the ‘court 
sceptic’ narrative was not as prevalent within unionist discourses as it was 
later to become. Rather, unionist opposition to and criticisms of the Bill of 
Rights process tended to be framed in terms more familiar to political life 
in Northern Ireland. The perception held by unionist politicians was that 
human rights discourse in Northern Ireland was inimical to unionist 
narrative self-understandings in the sense that the draft proposals had the 
potential to undermine the constitutional relationship between Northern 
Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom. Furthermore, unionists argued 
that human rights discourse in Northern Ireland disproportionately focused 
on the human rights abuses conducted by the state rather than by non-state 
actors such as the various paramilitary, terrorist organisations in Northern 
Ireland. Significantly, their narrative was framed as a response to, as they 
perceived it, the unrepresentativeness of the first NIHRC under the 
chairmanship of the distinguished human rights scholar Brice Dickson. 
The Northern Ireland Act 1998 did not specify how many part-time 
commissioners were to be appointed, unlike the Equality Commission 
created by the Act, which recommended that the Equality Commission 
should have between 14 and 20 members. Initially, in addition to the chief 
commissioner, there were nine part-time commissioners appointed by the 
then secretary of state for Northern Ireland, Mo Mowlam MP, to the 
NIHRC. In terms of gender and religious breakdown the first Commission 
comprised five women and five men and six of the first commissioners 
were from a perceived Protestant background and four from a perceived 
Catholic background. However, unionism's problem was not with the 
religious composition of the NIHRC but with the fact that, as unionist 
leaders perceived it, the commissioners were insufficiently identifiable 
with the unionist community. In other words, while they would be 
nominally Protestant for the purposes of an equality monitoring forum it 
did not necessarily follow that they were representative of the unionist 
community at large. According to a former adviser to UUP leader David 
Trimble, the UUP ‘took umbrage because while it was technically 
representative in terms of religion it was as far as we were concerned, in 
no way representative politically’ (interview with Dr Steven King as 
recorded in Livingstone and Murray 2005, 40). Or similarly as a DUP 
policy document put it, 
We are concerned about the make-up of the Commission and the activity 
of the Commission since its inception. We believe it has shown scant 
regard for the unionist community in general and the majority anti-
Agreement opinion of that community in particular (DUP 2003). 
By 2001, however, it appeared that the government was beginning to take 
steps to address unionist concerns about the NIHRC's composition through 
the appointment in November 2001 of Dr Chris McGimpsey. At the time 
McGimpsey was a UUP councillor in West Belfast and a high-profile 
liberal unionist who was a strong supporter of the Belfast Agreement. 
McGimpsey was the first obvious party political appointee to the 
Commission and whereas his appointment was welcomed by the UUP, 
unionists who opposed the Belfast Agreement treated it with more caution. 
Members of the Northern Ireland Assembly (MLAs) first had the 
opportunity to deliberate upon the proposals from the NIHRC's first public 
consultation exercise in September 2001 during a debate on a motion 
brought before the Assembly by two unionist members of the Assembly. 
The motion stated that the NIHRC, ‘in the context of the development of a 
Bill of Rights ... has failed to discharge its remit, as given to it by the 
Belfast Agreement (1998), in its various contributions on the debate on 
developing human rights in Northern Ireland’.7 Such was the strength of 
feeling against the motion brought by the unionist politicians that a 
petition of concern was presented by 30 MLAs from the main nationalist 
parties, the Social Democratic and Labour party (SDLP) and Sinn Fein, 
and from cross-community parties, the Alliance Party (APNI) and the 
Northern Ireland Women's Coalition (NIWC). During the debate 
nationalist and republican politicians supported the efforts of the NIHRC, 
arguing that in certain places they were not going far enough in terms of 
the constitutional protection of certain rights. They also criticised unionist 
politicians for bringing the motion and lamented their failure, as they saw 
it, to implement faithfully the vision for human rights contained in the 
Agreement. As one Sinn Fein representative stated, 
Rights and equality are alien words to the Unionist mind-set, but the 
agreement and the Act put human rights at the centre of political, social 
and economic change on this island ... Unionism has never recognised, let 
alone reflected on, the particular circumstances of the North and the 
construction of a state whose very existence depended on division, 
inequality and the abuse of human rights.8 
Unionist contributions to that first debate in the Northern Ireland 
Assembly focused heavily on the unrepresentativeness, as they perceived 
it, of the NIHRC and its bias against the unionist community rather than 
relying on a ‘court sceptic’ narrative. As one DUP representative argued, 
The role played by the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission has 
diminished the human rights issue in Northern Ireland. It has led many 
people to reflect that those who speak for human rights issues are speaking 
on behalf of criminals, terrorists, and people who do not wish goodwill to 
others in our country ... The Human Rights Commission did not have 
representatives from the Unionist community, nor did it have people who 
had previously been members of either of the main Unionist parties.9 
Significantly, during the debate only one unionist representative relied on 
a ‘court sceptic’ argument: 
Every Member should pause before endorsing the commission's 
maximalist interpretation of human rights. A maximalist human rights 
culture is in danger of eclipsing this institution. Under direct rule, limited 
democratic accountability lasted for too long. The intervention of a 
massive bill of rights into all areas of policy-making would imply that 
judges would have decision-making powers that would otherwise rightly 
rest with this democratically accountable body.10 
The DUP (2003) responded formally to the NIHRC's 2001 public 
consultation but the UUP issued no such formal response. While the 
DUP's overarching narrative against the proposals was dominated by a 
wider critique of the GFA, concern about the NIHRC's 
unrepresentativeness and how it had exceeded the remit given to it in the 
Agreement to consult on a Bill of Rights, there is evidence in the 
document to suggest that the ‘court sceptic’ narrative was creeping into 
unionist discourses. For example, as argued in the DUP's 2003 document, 
The more detailed and extensive a bill of rights, the less scope exists for 
democracy to function. People elect politicians not judges or Human 
Rights Commissioners. This reality must not be ignored or forgotten. We 
therefore support a more limited bill of rights where the democratic 
process can flourish free from arbitrarily defined boundaries ... For the 
most part where the Human Rights Commission seeks to extend these 
rights it trespasses on essentially political questions. We believe such 
matters are best left to a democratic, accountable and fair Assembly in 
Northern Ireland (DUP 2003, 4). 
We would caution that the judiciary should not be permitted to assume the 
role of the legislative branch of government (DUP 2003, 60). 
Despite the robust opposition expressed in public about the NIHRC's 
proposals, unionists were, nevertheless, eager to demonstrate that they 
were not against the idea of a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland. Indeed, 
writing in the Belfast Telegraph just after the NIHRC had launched its 
public consultation, the then UUP MP Jeffrey Donaldson argued that the 
NIHRC's proposals disappointed and concerned him because of his 
‘commitment to the importance of a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland’. 
Furthermore he stressed that ‘my party and I have long advocated such a 
Bill for all the people of Northern Ireland. As a parliamentarian, I 
recognise the fundamental significance of a Bill of Rights for any truly 
democratic society’ (Belfast Telegraph, 1 October 2001). Specifically, the 
unionist MP critiqued aspects of the NIHRC's proposals by relying on a 
‘court sceptic’ argument, arguing that the Commission's proposal in the 
Bill of Rights that all elections in Northern Ireland should be held under a 
system of proportional representation ‘should be decided in democratically 
elected forums after consultation and debate, not by the courts’. Despite 
not making a formal response to the NIRHC's 2001 public consultation, 
three UUP politicians responded individually to the consultation. One of 
those respondents, Dr Esmond Birnie, raised ‘court sceptic’ concerns 
about many of the socioeconomic rights proposed in the NIHRC's 
document: 
Whilst having no doubt that many of the aspirations listed are very worthy 
they will involve the outlay of resources by government and are they 
necessarily justiciable? Whilst it might be claimed that judges in practice 
would exercise their capability to scrutinise socio-economic rights with 
modesty, should we have to rely on such reserve? The institutions of 
democratically accountable regional government at Stormont are still 
fragile and it may be dangerous to be seen to be putting legislators into a 
straightjacket of enshrined socio-economic rights (Submission 268 
NIHRC, 2003, Dr Esmond Birnie MLA, Response to making a Bill of 
Rights for Northern Ireland, 30 November 2001). 
Between September 2001 and March 2010 the specific issue of a Bill of 
Rights for Northern Ireland was debated on five separate occasions.11 Four 
of those debates took place after May 2007 when devolved, power-sharing 
government returned to Northern Ireland. The return of devolution also 
coincided with the work of the Northern Ireland Bill of Rights Forum 
which, as we have noted, met for the first time in December 2006 but 
began its serious work under the chairmanship of international human 
rights lawyer Chris Sidoti in April 2007. However, since that first debate 
in the Assembly, ‘court sceptic’ arguments have become increasingly 
prominent within unionist discourses about a Northern Ireland Bill of 
Rights compared to earlier parts of the Bill of Rights process. For 
example, during a debate in April 2008 in the Assembly on the recently 
published proposals from the NIBoRF, one unionist representative 
explained that he was: 
Surprised that the group adopted such a maximalist approach. When I, as a 
member of the politicians' grouping within the forum, expressed my 
concern that attempts were being made to take decision-making away 
from the political process and to create a legal or courtroom-based 
decision-making process, I was ignored.12 
Similarly DUP MLA Nelson McCausland argued that: 
Power, particularly over social and economic matters, must not be 
transferred from democratically elected representatives to the courts. The 
role of the courts is to interpret and apply law but not to make it ... The 
maximalist approach that was taken would, if implemented, disempower 
the democratic process. I fear that decisions would be made in the courts 
rather than in the Assembly and Parliament.13 
One explanation that deepens our understanding of why ‘court sceptic’ 
arguments became more prevalent within unionist discourses surrounds 
the creation of the Bill of Rights Forum. Its deliberative structure of 
plenary meetings and working groups meant unionist representatives were 
sitting across the table from political and community representatives who 
disagreed with their position on a Bill of Rights. This required unionist 
politicians to reach much deeper into their intellectual reserves on the 
issue than before in order to justify, defend and explain their position. 
Furthermore, the quality and experience of both the DUP and UUP 
representatives in terms of the legal, constitutional and often philosophical 
issues raised by discussions about rights was of a sufficiently high 
standard to engage with the issue. Both delegations consisted of lawyers, 
academics and those with public policy experience. It would appear that 
unionists came to view ‘court sceptic’ arguments as a narrative within 
which they could frame their criticism of the proposals that emerged from 
the NIBoRF and subsequently the NIHRC in 2008. 
As noted previously, the paragraph contained in the Belfast/Good Friday 
Agreement that mandates the NIHRC to consult on the nature, size and 
scope of a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights refers to the fact that a Bill of 
Rights should reflect the ‘particular circumstances’ of Northern Ireland 
and that, specifically, these additional rights should ‘reflect the principles 
of mutual respect for the identity and ethos of both communities and parity 
of esteem’. This debate about the particular circumstances has been 
absolutely foundational to the entire debate about the Bill of Rights. The 
question of whether the Agreement empowered the NIHRC to adopt a 
limited or expansive interpretation of its responsibilities is a highly 
contested issue among the political parties in Northern Ireland. As the 
chair of the Bill of Rights Forum, Chris Sidoti put it in the final report of 
the Bill of Rights Forum, 
No issue divided Forum members more than the understanding of what 
constituted ‘the particular circumstances of Northern Ireland’. This 
challenging issue was discussed explicitly on many occasions and 
ultimately arose in discussion of almost every proposed recommendation 
(Bill of Rights Forum 2008, 12). 
Differences and disagreement about the answer to that question have 
broadly reflected conventional political dividing lines with the two main 
unionist political parties in Northern Ireland, the DUP and UUP, on one 
side advocating a limited interpretation where a Northern Ireland Bill of 
Rights deals with issues around parading, language and some cultural 
identification issues, and the nationalist and republican political parties, 
the SDLP and Sinn Fein, on the other side supporting an expansive 
interpretation of the Commission's mandate where a wider range of 
socioeconomic, civil and political rights are considered and supported for 
inclusion. Additional rights proposed by the NIHRC included a general 
right to work; a right to accommodation; five new provisions to ensure the 
rights of persons arrested or detained for questioning; a right for everyone 
to have access, on general terms of equality, to public service; a right that 
membership of public bodies must, as far as practicable, be representative 
of society in Northern Ireland; a right to appropriate healthcare and social 
care services free at the point of use and within a reasonable time; a right 
for everyone to an adequate standard of living sufficient for that person 
and their dependants; a right not to be allowed to fall into destitution; a 
right to adequate accommodation appropriate to needs; a right to work; a 
right to have the environment protected; and a right to social security 
(NIHRC 2008). It needs to be emphasised that the NIHRC did not pluck 
its proposals from nowhere but, instead, engaged in a detailed exercise to 
identify a methodology that could be used to take a position on what 
constituted the particular circumstances of Northern Ireland. The 
Commission's methodology applied a comprehensive and detailed seven-
step process that was applied to the consideration of each of the individual 
substantive rights and then the secondary provisions (See NIHRC 2008, 
appendix 1). As the NIHRC would argue, it is being both faithful to the 
1998 Agreement in its interpretation of the phrase the ‘particular 
circumstances’ and consistent with international human rights norms in 
proposing for inclusion in a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights the rights it 
has. 
In many ways it could be argued that the greater prominence of ‘court 
sceptic’ arguments within unionist discourses on a Northern Ireland Bill of 
Rights came as a response to the fact that both the NIHRC and the Bill of 
Rights Forum adopted, as unionists argued, an expansive and elastic 
interpretation of what the phrase ‘particular circumstances’ meant. In other 
words it could be viewed as an instrumental response to the concern that if 
acted upon and translated into law as they currently stood the NIHRC 
proposals would see power over these matters transferred from the 
legislature to the judiciary. As one DUP representative put it, 
It should be in the domain of the Assembly, not the courts, to direct where 
our limited resources go. At times, I might have an argument with the 
Health Minister about his use of resources, but neither he nor any other 
Member would disagree that we all want the highest attainable standard of 
health for the citizens of Northern Ireland. However, I believe passionately 
that the decisions on where limited resources should go should lie with the 
Assembly and with other elected institutions; it should not be in the 
domain of unelected judges to make up laws and spend resources from the 
bench. I would oppose that very strongly.14 
Similarly, as another unionist representative argued, 
The agreement mandated the commission to engage in a modest task, not 
one of industrial proportions. The commission was merely invited to 
consult and advise on the scope for supplementary rights, nothing more. It 
was not mandated to devise a new bill of rights or to change our socio-
economic context through the creation of numerous new rights; it was 
merely mandated to examine the scope for rights supplementary to the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Quite how we got from that very 
modest, realistic task to a 189-page document from the Northern Ireland 
Human Rights Commission that proposes to hand over significant sections 
of public policy to the courts—taking them from democratically elected 
representatives—is something of a mystery.15 
Unionists' reliance on a ‘court sceptic’ narrative to articulate their 
opposition to the NIHRC proposals for a Bill of Rights increased 
significantly after publication of the NIHRC's advice on a Bill of Rights to 
the UK government in December 2008. The prominence that ‘court 
sceptic’ arguments came to assume within unionist discourses can be 
demonstrated in three ways. First, for Daphne Trimble, one of the unionist 
members of the NIHRC who dissented from the NIHRC's advice on a Bill 
of Rights, concern about the expansion of judicial power that might result 
from the proposals regarding the rules on locus standi, which govern an 
individual or group's ability to bring a case to the courts under the 
legislation, was the issue that caused her to issue a note of dissent in 
opposition to the NIHRC's report. As Trimble argued, 
That just widens the whole thing up so much so that any and every NGO 
will be able to go to a judge and say my little interest group who doesn't 
think their housing is adequate will be able to go to the court and seek a 
remedy. It will take so much power away from the political process and 
put it into the hands of our judiciary. For me, once I realised that was 
going to happen I felt that was the point at which I could no longer even 
look at what was being proposed in terms of individual rights and saying 
yes I could live with that one or no I can't live with that one. That was the 
point where I came to the view that I had to say no to everything.16 
Second, an Assembly debate in March 2010 on a Sinn Fein motion 
criticising the British government for its response to the NIHRC's 
proposals shows that seven out of the eight unionist MLAs from the DUP 
and UUP who made contributions to the debate did so by relying partly on 
a ‘court sceptic’ argument to express concern. For example, as Jonathan 
Bell, a former member of the NIHRC and unionist politician argued, ‘we 
cannot have a situation where democracy is diluted and where the voting 
system is made subservient to some form of unelected court’.17 Third, in 
their responses to the government's 2010 consultation, both the DUP and 
UUP expressed their concern that the NIHRC's advice to the government 
could result in an enhanced role for the judiciary at the expense of the 
legislature in Northern Ireland: 
The effect of these proposals would be to ring-fence certain rights and 
government activities, thus placing crucial democratic decisions in the 
hands of non-elected lawyers rather than the wishes of the people. The 
Northern Ireland Executive would not be free to respond to the genuine 
needs of Northern Ireland when their hands and much of their budget 
would be tied by judicial decisions (DUP 2010). 
The UUP is firmly of the view that such provisions would undermine the 
authority of democratically elected legislatures in the Assembly and in 
Parliament. They would also inevitably lead to increasing judicial 
activism, to an extent incompatible with the UK's constitution's 
understanding of the role of the courts (UUP 2010). 
Conclusion 
This article has sought to explore how post-Agreement unionist discourses 
about a Bill of Rights came to rely increasingly on what has been 
described as a ‘court sceptic’ narrative. It has sought to do this by 
considering the significant body of scholarship that exists on this topic 
which has examined both the normative and descriptive basis for what a 
‘court sceptic’ narrative might look like. It has argued that a ‘court 
sceptic’ narrative understands that in a democratic polity citizens will have 
genuine disagreements about what rights are constitutive of the common 
good but that this narrative identifies the legislature and not the courts as 
the most appropriate place for the resolution of disagreement about rights, 
and has located the ‘court sceptic’ narrative within a wider discourse of 
political constitutionalism. Furthermore, it has considered the evidence 
that exists from a range of sources such as debates in the Northern Ireland 
Assembly and consultation responses, which show that over the past 10 
years a ‘court sceptic’ narrative has become increasingly prominent within 
unionist discourses about a Bill of Rights. It would be easy to dismiss how 
unionists have relied on a ‘court sceptic’ narrative as nothing more than an 
instrumental response to, as they saw it, the NIHRC's insistence on going 
beyond the remit of the Belfast Agreement in proposing an expansive Bill 
of Rights for Northern Ireland—as a short-term tactic with no more 
significance than that. Furthermore, one could dismiss unionist 
recalcitrance when it comes to human rights in Northern Ireland as 
indicative of a wider ideological malaise within unionist political thought 
and yet further evidence to support the claim often made by unionism's 
political opponents that it is a profoundly backward-looking, regressive 
and incoherent tradition of political thought. Others may choose to 
compare unionist reluctance to embrace proposals for a Northern Ireland 
Bill of Rights to the myopic attitudes held by many unionist politicians 
during the years of single unionist party rule at Stormont from 1921 until 
1972. 
However, to dismiss the unionist narrative in such a way would be like 
throwing the baby out with the bathwater. Indeed, far from unionist 
discourses about a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights representing another 
example of ‘unionist exceptionalism’, it could be argued that there is 
something deeper going on within unionism that might be missed without 
closer reflection and analysis. Relying on ‘court sceptic’ arguments has 
created an opportunity for unionism to become part of a much larger, 
broader narrative of commonwealth constitutionalism than the marginal, 
recalcitrant and sectarian rump that it is often perceived to be, and places 
them within a much wider debate and narrative about the future of the 
protection of human rights in the UK and the protection of rights in 
common law countries more generally. As one public law scholar argues, 
‘there is no neutral language of public law. We can understand what a 
writer is saying only if we understand the political tradition within which 
the writer works’ (Loughlin 1992, 230). In other words a deeper 
understanding of why unionists relied heavily upon ‘court sceptic’ theory 
can only be acquired by considering the tradition of reflection about the 
British constitution in which unionism is grounded. Unionism, because it 
is shaped by the British constitutional tradition in terms of its 
constitutional analysis, will arguably feel more comfortable within a 
discourse of political constitutionalism, where ‘court sceptic’ arguments 
find their theoretical origins. This discourse recognises and prioritises the 
sovereignty of parliament, is sceptical of judicial processes for resolving 
matters of public policy and considers that it is parliament's job to protect 
rights and liberties, not that of the courts. Indeed, so interwoven are 
unionists with this British constitutional tradition that when support has 
been expressed for human rights by influential strands of unionist opinion 
it is often done so with an appeal to UK constitutional history. For 
example, as argued by one unionist politician, 
The Democratic Unionist Party will bow to nobody in its defence of 
human rights. We stand in the British tradition of the Magna Carta and in 
the British tradition of William of Orange and the Bill of Rights. We also 
stand in the British tradition of the mother of Parliaments, which has 
enshrined democratic rights and freedoms here.18 
In this sense unionism is very much rooted in the British parliamentary 
experience (Aughey 1989). Therefore, as Catherine Turner argues, 
‘democratic responsibility features predominantly in Unionist political 
thinking reflecting the primacy afforded to the position of Parliament as 
sovereign law making authority’ (Turner 2010, 454). To a certain extent, 
therefore, this narrative was there for unionists to discover, rather than 
invent, because of how interwoven a ‘court sceptic’ narrative is with the 
very essence of the British constitutional tradition of respect for the 
sovereignty of parliament, of which unionism views itself as being a 
central part. However, and this is important,19 because of the constitutional 
reforms introduced by the Labour government in the period between 1997 
and 2005, UK constitutional discourse and practice have shifted away 
from the old constitution with its political orientations towards a new 
constitution, and it may become increasingly difficult for unionists to 
maintain this position in the uncertain and shifting constitutional culture in 
the UK. As one scholar has identified, this shift towards legal 
constitutionalism in the UK will be a ‘major axis of constitutional tension, 
change and development over the next ten years’ (O'Cinneide 2008, 161). 
In maintaining this position on a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland 
unionists will have to acknowledge this significant dialectic in UK 
constitutional discourse. Nevertheless, while there is a sense that over the 
course of recent history unionism's political representatives have been 
guilty of scoring intellectual own goals and of finding themselves in a 
condition of ideological stasis, what influential strands of unionist opinion 
think about human rights as that term has been interpreted in Northern 
Ireland is considerably more nuanced and complicated than the narrative 
often presented in academic literature and in popular political discourse in 
Northern Ireland. 
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